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Abstract
This paper explores the relationships between the hard security concepts of identity and privacy on the one
hand, and the soft security concepts of trust and reputation on the other hand. We specifically focus on two
vulnerabilities that current trust and reputation systems have: the change of identity and multiple identities
problems. As a result, we provide a privacy-preserving solution to these vulnerabilities which integrates the
explored relationships among identity, privacy, trust and reputation. We also provide a prototype of our
solution to these vulnerabilities and an application scenario.
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1. Introduction
Security-related studies in the Multiagent Systems
(MAS) research field have been increasing over the
last few years, as have intelligent autonomous agents
and MAS based applications. This is mainly due to
the fact that an understanding of the actual risk when
using these sorts of applications is needed, since an
agent’s incorrect or inappropriate behavior may cause
non-desired effects such as money and data loss.
Rasmusson and Jansson [1] first introduced the
difference between two approaches to security in in-
formation systems, i.e., what they called hard and
soft security. On the one hand, the term hard secu-
rity is used for traditional security mechanisms like
authentication, authorization, integrity, confidential-
ity, etc. On the other hand, the term soft security is
INOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was
accepted for publication in Engineering Applications of Arti-
ficial Intelligence. Changes resulting from the publishing pro-
cess, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural for-
matting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be re-
flected in this document. Changes may have been made to
this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive
version was subsequently published: Jose M. Such, Agustin
Espinosa, Ana Garcia-Fornes, and Vicent Botti. Partial Iden-
tities as a Foundation for Trust and Reputation. Engineer-
ing Applications of Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 24 N. 7 pp.
1128-1136 (2011). http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S0952197611001084
used for social control mechanisms in general.
A major difference between these two approaches
is related to how they deal with intruders in a sys-
tem. Hard security mechanisms - such as identity
management - aim to prevent intruders from joining
the system so that the system is supposedly intruder
free. Soft security mechanisms - such as trust and
reputation - expect, and even accept, the presence
of intruders in the system, so they attempt to iden-
tify the intruders and prevent them from harming the
other actors in the system.
We strongly encourage research transversal to these
two approaches to security. This is due to the fact
that when relationships between these two approaches
are not taken into account, some vulnerabilities can
emerge which otherwise would not. The agent com-
munity in particular has not been taking the relation-
ships between these two approaches into account.
Current Trust and Reputation systems are based
on the assumption that identities are long-lived, so
that ratings about a particular entity from the past
are related to the same entity in the future. However,
when such systems are actually used in real domains
this assumption is no longer valid. For instance, an
entity which has a low reputation due to its cheat-
ing behavior may be really interested in changing her
identity and restarting her reputation from scratch.
This is what Jøsang et al. [2] called the change of
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identities problem. This problem has also been iden-
tified by other researchers under different names (e.g.
whitewashing [3]).
The work of Kerr and Cohen [4] shows that Trust
and Reputation Systems exhibit multiple vulnerabil-
ities that can be exploited by attacks performed by
cheating agents. Among these vulnerabilities, the
re-entry vulnerability exactly matches the change of
identities problem exposed by Jøsang et al. They
propose a simple attack that takes advantage of this
vulnerability: An agent opens an account (identity)
in a marketplace, uses her account to cheat for a pe-
riod, then abandons it to open another.
Kerr and Cohen [4] also point out the fact that en-
tities could create new accounts (identity in the sys-
tem) at will, not only after abandoning their previous
identity but also holding multiple identities at once.
This is known as the sybil attack [5]. An example
of this attack could be an agent that holds multiple
identities in a marketplace and attempts to sell the
same product through each of them, increasing the
probability of being chosen by a potential buyer.
It is worth mentioning that this is not an au-
thenticity problem. Interactions among entities are
assured, i.e, an agent holding an identity is sure of
being able to interact with the agent that holds the
other identity. However, there is nothing which could
have prevented the agent behind that identity from
holding another identity previously or holding mul-
tiple identities at once. For instance, let us take a
buyer agent and a seller agent in an e-marketplace.
The buyer has an identity in the e-marketplace un-
der the name of buy1 and the seller two identities
in the e-marketplace seller1 and seller2. Authentica-
tion in this case means that if buy1 is interacting with
seller1 she is sure that she is interacting with who she
wants. However, buy1 has no idea that seller1 and
seller2 are the same entity.
These vulnerabilities can be more or less harm-
ful depending on the final domain of the application.
However, these vulnerabilities should be, at least,
considered in domains in which trust and reputation
play a crucial role. For instance, in e-marketplaces
these vulnerabilities can cause users being seriously
damaged by losing money. Another example can be
a social network like Last.fm1 in which users can rec-
ommend music to each other. A user who always
fails to recommend good music to other users may
1Last.fm http://www.last.fm
gain a very bad reputation. If this user creates a
new account in Last.fm (a new identity in Last.fm)
her reputation starts from scratch, and she is able to
keep on recommending bad music. Users may be re-
ally bothered with such recommendations and move
to other social networks. In this case, the one seri-
ously damaged is the social network itself by losing
users.
As far as we are concerned, the two vulnerabili-
ties presented are partially due to the lack of a clear
definition of identity and its relationship to trust and
reputation. In this sense, we introduce in the next
section the concept of partial identity and relate this
concept to trust and reputation later on in sections
3 and 4. In section 5 we introduce what we call the
Partial Identity Unlinkability Problem (PIUP) which
is a generalization of these two vulnerabilities. As a
result, a solution to PIUP is proposed in section 6,
taking into consideration partial identities and their
relation to trust and reputation.
As the concepts of identity, trust and reputation
are based on information about entities, the privacy
of the entities may be compromised. This is because,
nowadays, everything is inter-connected anytime and
everywhere so that users are constantly exposed to
personal data collection and processing without even
being aware of it [6]. For this reason, our solution to
PIUP is based on privacy-enhancing identity manage-
ment [7], as explained in section 6. Finally, section
7 presents an implementation of a prototype of our
solution to PIUP and an application scenario, and
section 8 presents some related works.
2. Identity and Partial Identities
The identity and partial identity terms are broadly
used in identity management literature such as [7], [8]
and [9]. However, there is a lack of clear and formal
definitions of these two terms. In this section, we
propose formal definitions of both identity and par-
tial identity.
We assume that an entity can be: a legal person
(a human being, a company, etc.) or a software entity
(an intelligent agent, a virtual organization, etc.).
We also assume that entities are described by at-
tributes attached to them. Attributes can describe a
great range of topics [9]. For instance, entity names,
biological characteristics (only for human beings), lo-
cation (permanent address, geo-location at a given
time), competences (diploma, skills), social charac-
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Figure 1: Identity and Partial Identities of Bob
teristics (affiliation to groups, friends), and even be-
haviors (personality or mood).
Definition 1. Given a finite set of attributes A =
{a1, . . . , an} each one with a finite domain Vai =
{v1, . . . , vk}, a set of entities E and the entity e ∈ E,
a partial identity of the entity e is a vector Ie =
(i1, . . . , in), satisfying ij ∈ Vaj and ∀d[d ∈ E \ {e} →
∀Id(Id 6= Ie)].
The set of attributes A, the set of values for each
attribute a denoted as Va and the set of entities E
are context-dependent. Therefore, a partial identity
Ie of an entity e ∈ E sufficiently identifies (repre-
sented by the second constraint in the definition) the
entity e within the set E considering A and Va. For
instance, let a human being be registered with a given
profile in the Last.fm social network. This profile is
a partial identity because it does sufficiently identify
the human being among all of the different entities
registered in Last.fm.
Although each partial identity usually identifies
the entity in a specific context or role, the same par-
tial identity can identify the entity in different con-
texts. For instance, a driver license identifies an entity
in the context of operating a motorized vehicle but it
also identifies an entity in the context of accessing a
disco only for adults.




The identity Ie of an entity e is the union of all of
the partial identities Ije of e. In this sense, an identity
of an entity is composed of many partial identities.
In order for the reader to better understand the iden-
tity and partial identity concepts, Figure 1 shows the
identity and some of the partial identities of an indi-
vidual person called Bob. Four partial identities are
shown regarding four contexts: government, work,
health care and social networking (Last.fm). For the
sake of clarity, we only show some attributes that
make up each of the partial identities represented. It
is easily observed that the name and address of Bob
are shared by three partial identities but are not used
in the partial identity he uses in Last.fm.
2.1. Real Identities
We also consider an special type of partial identi-
ties: real identities. A real identity is a partial iden-
tity that sufficiently identifies an entity within the
set of all of the legal persons — entities that can be
liable for their acts in front of the law, such as hu-
man beings, companies, etc. As described later on in
section 6, we use real identities for accountability con-
cerns such as law enforcement. For this reason, real
identities are restricted to only legal persons. A real
identity would be for example: Bob Andrew Miller,
born in Los Angeles, CA, USA on July 7, 1975.
Software entities (intelligent agents, virtual orga-
nizations, etc.) cannot have real identities because,
up to now, they cannot be liable for their acts in front
of the law. However, this may change in the future
if they finally achieve some kind of legal personhood,
as suggested by [10] and [11]. In this sense, they may
be part of the set of all of the legal persons and will
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have a real identity.
3. Trusting Entities through Partial Identities
In this section, we propose partial identities as a
foundation to build trust relationships. In this sense,
we first introduce the concept of trust.
According to Gambetta [12], trust is ”the sub-
jective probability by which an individual, A, expects
that another individual, B, performs a given action
on which its welfare depends“.
Most of the trust models proposed by the agent
community are based on Gambetta’s definition and
treat trust as a probability. Different grounding the-
ories are used to build these models. Although most
of them are based on Game Theory (for a survey refer
to [13]) there are other probabilistic approaches like
[14], in which Sierra and Debenham use Information
Theory.
Agent community has also developed cognitive mod-
els which treat trust differently. For instance, Castel-
franchi and Falcone [15] define trust as ”a mental
state, a complex attitude of an agent x towards an-
other agent y about the behaviour/action relevant for
the result (goal) g“.
Both probabilistic and cognitive models share that
trust is established from a trustor (the one who trusts)
to a trustee (the one who is trusted). Thus, we fo-
cus on trust as a directed relationship between two
entities. In this sense, a primary requirement is that
the trustor is able to recognize the trustee when they
interact with each other.
In the real world, an individual can recognize other
individuals by means of identity documents such as a
passport. However, inter-personal meetings are also
carried out without the needing for such documents.
For instance, a trustor is able to recognize a trustee
from past interactions by recognizing her face.
In the digital world there is no physical contact,
all of the interactions between entities are carried
out through online networks and most of them across
the Internet. The increase in global connectivity in-
creases the number of entities taking part in the dig-
ital world and also the number of interactions they
carry out. In this scenario, recognizing an entity in
an interaction usually means authenticating it using
technologies like Kerberos2, OpenID3, and so on. En-
2Kerberos http://web.mit.edu/Kerberos/
3OpenID http://openid.net/
tities are authenticated using such technologies ac-
cording to a partial identity that they hold.
We consider trust relationships to be established
between two entities through some of their partial
identities. Moreover, these partial identities represent
part of the context where the trust relationship is
established.
Partial identities are key parts in order to build
trust relationships. There are attributes of a partial
identity of an entity that clearly describe important
features of an entity. For instance, a corporate title
(such as chief executive officer) is an attribute which
is part of the partial identity of an employee of a
company. When this employee interacts with other
entities in a business context, his corporate title is
an important attribute that the rest of the entities in
that context will consider valuable to trust in him.
Figure 2 shows an example of a trust relation-
ship established between two entities through par-
tial identities. The entity with the username antoine
trusts (represented as a directed arrow) the entity
with the username JohnyFM (Adam John Wilkes).
This trust relationship is contextualized in Last.fm.
Moreover the favorite artist of both partial identities
plays a crucial role in the trust relationship. In this
sense, JohnyFM has as favorite artist Arturo San-
doval and antoine has Clifford Brown as his favorite
artist. Both Arturo Sandoval and Clifford Brown are
trumpet players. By knowing this, antoine may con-
sider music recommendations from JohnyFM to be
relevant for him, because they like the same kind of
music players.
4. Reputation through Partial Identities
In the previous section, we stated how trust rela-
tionships can be built through partial identities. In
this section, we state how partial identities relate to
reputation.
We understand reputation in the same way as
Sabater et al. in their Repage Model [16]. In this
sense, reputation is a social evaluation of a target en-
tity attitude towards socially desirable behavior which
circulates in the society (and can be agreed on or not
by each one of the entities in the society).
Reputation, just like trust, is known to be con-
text dependent [13]. For instance, a lawyer can have
a great reputation defending digital criminals while
having a bad reputation making cakes.
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Figure 2: Trust Through Partial Identities
Unlike trust, reputation also relates to anonymity.
The anonymity concept is defined by Pfitzmann and
Hansen in [8] as: ”Anonymity of a subject means that
the subject is not identifiable within a set of subjects“.
Reputation, as a social evaluation circulating in the
society, is anonymously assigned to an entity. There-
fore, the social evaluation any entity has about other
entities remains private (whenever she does not com-
municate her social evaluation to others in a non-
anonymous fashion).
The anonymous nature of reputation is sometimes
not taken into account, which leads to some prob-
lems. For instance, the eBay reputation system is not
anonymous which leads to an average 99% of positive
ratings [17]. This is due to the fact that entities in
eBay do not negatively rate other entities for fear of
retaliations which could damage their own reputation
and welfare.
We consider reputation as an anonymous social
evaluation of an entity in a given context through
one of its partial identities. In this sense, the partial
identity of the entity reputed is needed to define the
context of a reputation. Moreover, if an entity has
a reputation in a given context, all of the entities
interacting with this entity in the same context can be
aware of her reputation through her partial identity.
5. The Partial Identity Unlinkability Problem
After the definition of the partial identity concept
and its relationships to trust and reputation has been
given, we are now in a position to define what we call
the partial identity unlinkability problem (PIUP).
In section 1 we described two vulnerabilities that
affect trust and reputation systems: the multiple iden-
tities and the change of identities problems. As far
as we are concerned, these two vulnerabilities are
closely related to the unlinkability concept described
by Pfitzmann and Hansen in [8]. They define unlinka-
bility as ”Unlinkability of two or more items of inter-
est (IOIs, e.g., subjects, messages, actions, ...) from
an attacker’s perspective means that within the sys-
tem (comprising these and possibly other items), the
attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether these
IOIs are related or not“.
We use this definition of unlinkability made by
Pfitzmann and Hansen and our definition of partial
identity to formulate the PIUP:
Definition 3. The partial identity unlinkability prob-
lem (PIUP) states the impossibility that an entity,
which takes part in a system, is able to sufficiently
distinguish whether two partial identities in that sys-
tem are related or not.
It is easily observed that the change of identities
problem is an instantiation of PIUP, i.e., an entity
with an identity by which she is known to have a bad
reputation, acquires another identity with a fresh new
reputation so that other entities are unable to relate
the entity to its former reputation. In a similar way,
if an entity does not trust another entity, the latter
can change her identity. Therefore, the former entity
is unable to notice that the same entity which he used
to trust (distrust) is behind the new identity, so the
trust relationship is restarted.
Regarding multiple identities, a similar instanti-
ation can be made, so that an entity holds several
identities and has different reputations with each of
them. Thus, another entity is unable to relate the
different reputations that the entity has because it is
unaware of all of the identities the entity has. PIUP
relates to trust in the same way when multiple iden-
tities are considered. An entity can believe that she
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trusts multiple entities in a given system (such as a
specific marketplace), but she may be trusting the
same entity with different identities without being
aware of it.
5.1. The Straightforward Solution
PIUP is obviously solved by forcing the entities
taking part in a system to use their real identity. His-
torically, a real identity has been used to uniquely
identify persons [9].
If an entity is not allowed to change its identity,
then trust and reputation assessments of this identity
cannot be removed. Although the changing of real
identities has always been possible as a way of erasing
reputation, these changes are not cost-free and do
not completely erase the reputation. For instance,
there are some companies that change their name in
order to erase their previous reputation. However, a
link with the previous reputation can be made (e.g.
looking at its employees in order to find employees of
the former company).
Due to the impossibility of completely erasing rep-
utation, new online services are emerging related to
the management of the online reputation of an en-
tity with a real identity. For instance, Reputation-
Defender4 and Mamba IQ5 provide services to report
the online reputation of an entity with a real iden-
tity (individuals or companies). These services usu-
ally find information related to an entity searching
in blogs, social networks, and audio and video pages.
These services also give the entities advice on improv-
ing their online reputation.
However, the solution of forcing entities to use
their real world identities exposes a great disadvan-
tage: privacy loss. Fisher-Hübner and Hedbom in
[6] define privacy as ”the right to informational self-
determination, i.e. the right of individuals to deter-
mine for themselves when, how, to what extent and
for what purposes information about them is commu-
nicated to others“.
Nowadays, in the era of global connectivity (ev-
erything is inter-connected anytime and everywhere)
privacy is a great concern regarding identity manage-
ment in the digital world. While in the real world ev-
eryone decides (at least implicitly) what to tell other
people about themselves (after considering the situ-
ational context and the role each person plays), in
4http://www.reputationdefender.com/
5http://www.mambaiq.com
the digital world users have more or less lost effective
control over their personal data. Users are therefore
exposed to constant personal data collection and pro-
cessing without being aware of it [6].
6. A Privacy Preserving Solution for PIUP
After the definition of PIUP and the privacy is-
sues of the straightforward solution, we provide a pri-
vacy preserving solution to PIUP so that trust and
reputation systems can be used without PIUP and
preserving users’ privacy. Figure 3 shows our pro-
posed architecture for trust and reputation systems.
There are two layers that make up the architecture:
the identity management layer and the trust and rep-
utation model layer. The identity management layer
is in charge of providing the entities taking part in
a trust and reputation system with partial identity
management. The trust and reputation model layer
is in charge of providing the actual trust and reputa-
tion models being deployed in the system.
We assume that entities communicate to each other
following a secure connection (such as TLS), so that
the data they exchange in their interactions is pro-
vided with basic security features such as integrity
and confidentiality.
6.1. Identity Management Layer
The technical systems supporting the process of
management of partial identities are known as Iden-
tity Management Systems (IMSs) [9]. User-centric
privacy-enhancing IMSs are supposed to enable a user
to control the nature and amount of personal informa-
tion disclosed [7]. These infrastructures are usually
composed of three main parts:
• Identity Service (IdS) is composed of two kinds
of services: Identity Providers (IdPs), that issue
partial identities and validate these identities to
the RPs; and Relying Parties (RPs), that are a
set of APIs that allows services to check the
identity of the entities that interact with them.
• The Identity Selector (IS) provides a simple way
to manage partial identities and choose which
partial identity to be used in a given context.
• Attribute Service (AS) include services that al-
low an entity to determine the access control
rights of every other entity when accessing each
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Figure 3: Two-layer architecture for Trust and Reputation without PIUP
attribute of each partial identity she holds. At-
tributes can be managed and self-issued. Man-
aged attributes are verified by IdPs and are re-
liable (and provable) information about an en-
tity. Self-issued attributes contain information
about what an entity claims about itself. IdPs
can only verify that self-issued attributes are
what the entities claim about themselves.
Our solution to PIUP is based on once-in-a-lifetime
partial identities [18]. We propose that IdPs issue two
kinds of partial identities: permanent partial identi-
ties (PPIs) and regular partial identities (RPIs). En-
tities can only hold one PPI in a system. RPIs do
not pose any limitation. Although both kinds of par-
tial identities enable trust and reputation relation-
ships, only PPIs guarantee that PIUP is avoided.
Then, entities will choose to establish trust and repu-
tation through PPIs if they want to avoid PIUP. Our
proposed identity management layer considers three
main parties:
PIdP. The Permanent Identity Provider is an IdP
(or a federation of IdPs6) that issues PPIs to the enti-
ties taking part in the specific system. Entities must
register using a real identity which the PIdP will not
reveal to others. The PIdP is also in charge of forcing
one entity to only hold a PPI in this specific system.
IdPs. IdPs issue RPIs to the entities taking part
in the specific system. Entities request RPIs provid-
ing either a real identity, or a PPI that IdPs will not
reveal to others. There is no limitation in the number
6IMSs support the federation of IdPs that belong to the
same and also different remote security domains across the
Internet. A PIdP, then, can be implemented as a federation
of IdPs instead of only one IdP, minimizing the typical
drawbacks of a centralized trusted third party, such as being
a single point of failure (SPOF) and a possible efficiency
bottleneck. Examples of identity federation standards are





of IdPs per system as well as in the number of RPIs
per entity and per system.
Entities. Entities, which are in a given trust and
reputation system, select and manage their own par-
tial identities using the IS. Moreover, entities also act
as RPs that validate the partial identities of other
entities through the PIdP and the IdPs. Entities use
the AS to access attributes of other entities’ partial
identities. Entities also use the AS to set access con-
trol policies to their own partial identity attributes.
Figure 4 shows an example of an entity and its
partial identities for a given system. The entity has
the real identity with an attribute name Adam John
Wilkes. Using this real identity the entity has ob-
tained a PPI from the PIdP that includes two at-
tributes: name and role. This entity has also ob-
tained N RPIs from N different IdPs. Some of the
RPIs are obtained providing its PPI (such as RPI 1)
and some other using its real identity (such as RPI
N).
The identity management layer provides the fol-
lowing main features from the point of view of secu-
rity and privacy:
• Authentication of Partial Identities. Entities
use RP APIs in order to authenticate the partial
identities of the other entities taking part in the
trust and reputation system. Therefore, entities
are allowed to recognize to each other from in-
teraction to interaction and establish trust and
reputation relationships.
• PIUP avoidance. Only the PIdP is allowed to
issue PPIs for a given trust and reputation sys-
tem. The PIdP avoids that a previously reg-
istered entity (using a real identity) is able to
obtain a new PPI. There is no chance for an
entity in a trust and reputation system to have
two different PPIs. Therefore, trust and rep-
utation relationships built through PPIs avoid
PIUP.
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Figure 4: An example of an Entity as seen by the Identity Management Layer
• Multiple RPIs. Entities can hold multiple RPIs
in a system. There are many situations in which
entities could be interested in using multiple
RPIs. For instance, multiple RPIs can play a
crucial role for preserving privacy. In order to
avoid buyer profiling, entities could use a differ-
ent RPI for each interaction with another entity
[19].
• Hiding of original partial identities. IdPs (in-
cluding PIdP) act as independent third parties
that must be trusted by the entities taking part
in the trust and reputation system. For ob-
taining new partial identities (PPIs or RPIs),
entities must provide a real identity, or a PPI
to IdPs. IdPs do not make the original partial
identities available. Therefore, the rest of the
entities in the trust and reputation system are,
a priori7, not able to link a partial identity used
in the system to the corresponding original real
identity, PPI, or RPI.
• Entity control over partial identity attributes.
ASs allow entities to determine the access con-
trol rights over each attribute of a partial iden-
7Note that if the attributes between two partial identities of
the same entity are similar enough, another entity could infer
that these partial identities correspond to the same entity.
tity they hold. Entities are able to choose to
hide some of the attributes of a partial iden-
tity in a system as long as the resulting set of
attributes is still a partial identity, i.e., it suf-
ficiently identifies the entity among the set of
entities in that system.
• Entity accountability. Under special circum-
stances, such as law enforcement, the real iden-
tity of a misbehaving entity can be known. If
an entity misbehaves when using its PPI, the
PIdP can disclose its real identity if required
by a court. If an entity misbehaves when us-
ing one of its RPIs, IdPs can disclose the real
identity or the PPI that the entity used to ob-
tain a RPI. In case the entity used a PPI to
obtain such RPI, then the PIdP can use this
PPI to finally disclose the real identity of the
entity. Therefore, accountability is assured and
entities can be punished if necessary. This leads
entities to be liable for their acts and they will
take this into consideration before misbehaving.
6.2. Trust and Reputation Model Layer
On the top of the identity management layer, we
find the trust and reputation model layer. This layer
is the one which implements the actual trust and rep-
utation models being used in the system.
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Trust and reputation models in this layer are based
on the definitions of identity and partial identity and
their relationship with trust and reputation detailed
in sections 2, 3 and 4. In this sense, partial identi-
ties act as a foundation for the establishment of trust
and reputation among the entities taking part in the
system.
The concept of partial identity is totally indepen-
dent from the trust and reputation model being used.
Therefore, a privacy preserving solution to PIUP is
provided without the needing of re-designing the trust
and reputation models. However, as explained in sec-
tions 3 and 4, partial identities are part of the context
in which trust and reputation take place. Therefore,
trust and reputation models must be aware of par-
tial identities in order to extract the information they
need to compute trust and reputation.
In this sense, partial identities can be used by
trust and reputation systems for identifying an en-
tity from interaction to interaction and building trust
based on past interactions with her. For instance, Ur-
bano et al. propose the SinAlpha [20] model for trust.
This model is based on past experiences (successful
or not) which are converted into a measure of trust
in [0,1]. 0 means no trust and 1 means completely
trust. They recognize entities from interaction to in-
teraction by using the name of each entity. There-
fore, the only adaptation needed by this model is to
use partial identities as sets of only one attribute: the
name of each entity.
Another example of a trust and reputation model
which can be built using our two-layer architecture
is Fire [21] developed by Huynh et al. This model
takes into account not only past experiences but also
other sources of information to assess trust and rep-
utation. Concretely, Fire uses the role that an entity
is playing in an institutional structure as a mecha-
nism to assign default reputation to the entities. In
this sense, the role of the entities can be extracted
from their partial identity (whenever entities decide
to make it accessible to other entities).
Finally, the trust and reputation model layer also
allows heterogeneous trust and reputation systems.
In this sense, there is nothing that prevents differ-
ent entities from using different trust and reputation
models in the same trust and reputation system. En-
tities are not forced to use a concrete particular trust
and reputation model in a system. They could choose
the trust and reputation model they prefer for a given
system. Indeed, this fact opens the possibility of hav-
ing multiple vendors of trust and reputation models
to be used for different entities in the same system.
7. Prototype Implementation and Application
Scenario
In this section we describe the implementation of
a prototype for our solution to PIUP. We also provide
an application scenario and its implementation using
this prototype.
7.1. Prototype Implementation
We implemented one PIdP and one IdP both as
webapps running on top of the Tomcat8 web applica-
tion server. Both are developed using Axis29. PIdP
and IdP are implemented as secure web services us-
ing the API provided by the Axis2 security module
Rampart10. Rampart complies with the OASIS WS-
Security11 and WS-Trust12 standards.
We considered two kinds of entities: legal persons
and agents. In this way, we implemented agents as
simple Java objects that interact to each other by
sending and receiving messages using object method
calls inside the same JVM. These agents act on be-
half of legal persons. Agents also use Axis2 and Ram-
part APIs to call the services offered by the PIdP and
the IdP. These services (following the WS-Trust stan-
dard) include the issuance, renewal, cancellation and
validation of partial identities in the form of SAML213
security tokens. Entities can, then, use these SAML2
security tokens to prove their partial identities to
other agents. Moreover, agents can choose which at-
tributes of the attributes in a partial identity to in-
clude in each security token. Thus, they have the
control over what attributes are disclosed to what
other agents.
An agent calls the services of the PIdP using WS-
Security with X.509 certificates to obtain a PPI. These
X.509 certificates contains the real identity of the le-
gal person that an agent is acting on behalf of. We
considered the set of legal persons in Spain. Thus,










the Spanish Electronic Identification14 (DNIe) or the
Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre15 (FNMT).
The PPIs issued by the PIdP can contain attributes
that an agent chooses for itself (self-issued) or can
contain attributes from the real identity (managed)
of the legal person the agent is acting on behalf of.
The important point is that once the PIdP issues a
PPI, the PIdP keeps track of what real identity holds
what PPI and will always issue the same PPI to the
same real identity in a given system. Thus, the PIdP
avoids that an agent can have more than one PPI in
a given system. PPIs can also contain attributes that
the PIdP verified considering the real identities be-
hind them. For instance, an entity can be willing to
include an attribute in its PPI stating that it is over
18 years old. Then, the PIdP verifies it against the
birth date in the X.509 certificate, and if it is true
the PIdP includes the attribute in the PPI issued.
Afterwards, the entity is able to prove to other enti-
ties that it is over 18 years old without disclosing its
birth date.
Entities call the services of the IdP using WS-
Security with SAML2 tokens representing its PPI to
obtain a RPI. After that, the entity is able to prove
that it holds the RPI to other entities. Agents can ob-
tain as many as RPIs they desire. The IdP only keeps
track of which PPI is associated to which RPIs for ac-
countability concerns in case of law enforcement.
7.2. Application Scenario
An application Scenario for our proposed solution
to PIUP is an agent-mediated e-commerce ([22], [23])
application. Agent-mediated electronic commerce refers
to electronic commerce in which agent technologies
are applied to provide personalized, continuously run-
ning, semi-autonomous behavior. In agent-mediated
electronic commerce applications security, privacy, trust,
and reputation play a crucial role [24].
We describe an electronic market where seller agents
and buyer agents trade online services. In this sense,
buyer agents must be able to choose among seller
agents which sell the same services. One of the impor-
tant dimensions that a buyer will take into account in
her decision is the trust she has in each seller agent.
This trust can be based on successful previous inter-
actions with the same seller agent. A buyer agent
can trust in a seller agent regarding past interactions
14http://www.dnielectronico.es/
15http://www.fnmt.es/
by measuring: whether or not the seller agent pro-
visioned the service, the overall quality of the ser-
vice (QoS) bought, if there were hidden costs, etc. A
buyer agent can also trust in a seller agent regarding
some attributes of the seller agent’s partial identity
in the electronic market: registration date, corporate
title, skills, etc.
Another important dimension that a buyer agent
will take into account in her decision buying a service
is the reputation of the seller agent. In this case, it is
not what an agent thinks of a given seller agent but
what it is generally said about the seller agent in the
electronic market.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that seller
agents do not provide a service until they are paid.
Therefore, the reputation of buyer agents and the
trust other buyer and seller agents have in them are
not treated. We also assume that payments are car-
ried out using some kind of anonymous payment mech-
anism. Hence, the real identity of an entity is not
needed when paying for a service. For instance, the
untraceable electronic cash presented by Chaum et
al. [25] may be used.
In this scenario the PIUP is a great concern. Seller
agents should not be able to get rid of their trust and
reputation assessments. This could cause important
money loss. For instance, a seller agent can be cheat-
ing buyer agents by getting paid for a service which
will never be delivered. This obviously decreases the
trust and reputation that buyer agents have in this
seller agent. Hence, this seller agent decides to quit
the electronic market and re-entry into it with a new
fresh identity, restarting her trust and reputation as-
sessments from scratch. Another example would be a
seller agent which sell the same service under different
partial identities. In this sense, the probability that
a buyer agent chooses one of their partial identities
as the provider of the service increases.
We implemented one seller and three buyers. Each
buyer uses its own trust and reputation machinery
to model the trustworthiness of the sellers based on
previous interactions and personal attributes of the
sellers. The PPIs issued by the PIdP take values for
two attributes: name and role. Both sellers and buy-
ers register into the system using the PPI that the
PIdP issued for them — so that the system does not
know the real identity of the legal person that agents
are acting on behalf of. In this way, buyers are able
to identify providers from previous interactions and
build their own trust and reputation models being
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sure that the seller will not be able to hold any other
PPI.
The seller follows a normal distribution with a
mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 to model whether
it carries out the service requested in the way con-
sumers expect it. In this sense, when a buyer re-
quests a service to the seller, if the value returned
is in the interval [-1,1], the buyer considers that the
seller performed as expected. If the value returned is
out of this interval the buyers consider that the seller
did not perform as expected. When the seller per-
forms as expected, buyers rate them with 1. When
the seller does not perform as expected, buyers rate
them with 0. These ratings are inputs of the trust
and reputation model each buyer has.
Each buyer runs a different trust and reputation
model that is fed using past interactions with sell-
ers and attributes from sellers’ partial identities. We
implemented three models (each one for each buyer),
one simply using a mean of all the previous perfor-
mances to compute a trust value, one using the SinAl-
pha trust model that considers previous interactions,
and finally, one using the Fire trust and reputation
model which uses, among other information, previous
interactions and the role of the entities to be trusted.
The application scenario benefits from the follow-
ing features that the identity management layer pro-
vides (as stated in section 6.1):
• Authentication of Partial Identities. Buyers and
sellers are able to authenticate their partial iden-
tities (both PPIs and RPIs). Therefore, they
are allowed to recognize to each other from in-
teraction to interaction and establish trust and
reputation relationships.
• PIUP avoidance. There is no chance for a buyer
or a seller to have two different PPIs. Therefore,
trust and reputation relationships built through
PPIs avoid PIUP.
• Multiple RPIs. Buyers can hold multiple RPIs
and use a different one for each interaction with
the seller. Therefore, they are able to avoid that
the seller performs buyer profiling.
• Hiding of original partial identities. Both the
PIdP and the IdP do not make the partial iden-
tities needed to obtain a PPI or a RPI available.
Therefore, the rest of the agents are a priori not
able to link a partial identity used to the corre-
sponding original real identity or PPI.
• Entity accountability. If an agent misbehaves
when using its PPI, the PIdP can disclose its
real identity if required by a court. If an entity
misbehaves when using one of its RPIs, IdPs
can disclose the PPI that the entity used to ob-
tain a RPI. Then the PIdP can use this PPI to
finally disclose the real identity of the entity.
8. Related Work
Rehák and Pěchouček [26] relate trust and iden-
tity by modeling trust context and identity represen-
tation. They mainly focus on scenarios with scarce
resources such as sensor networks, in which an un-
derlying identity infrastructure cannot be assumed.
Jennings and Finkelstein [27] propose a unified iden-
tity for social software in business processes. They
propose building this unified identity by mining data
from different social silos. Once this unified identity
is built, it can be used as a foundation for trust and
reputation. These two approaches obviate privacy
concerns related to identity attributes.
Friedman and Resnick [18] propose a mechanism
for preventing name changes in a social arena. They
assume an intermediary, trusted by all of the entities
in the specific social arena without revealing one’s
real identity. However, they do not consider that real
identities should be revealed in special situations such
as law enforcement.
Anonymity also plays a crucial role for preserv-
ing privacy [28]. Anonymity is characterized by the
fact that an agent can interact with other parties in
a form that these other parties do not know the iden-
tity of the agent [24]. For instance, Korba et al. [29]
presents an anonymous agent communication mech-
anism based on the Tor network [30]. However, com-
plete anonymity poses a great disadvantage, it does
not allow trust and reputation assessments.
Warnier and Brazier [19] also present an agent
communication mechanism that offers some degree of
anonymity by means of what they call handlers. Han-
dlers act as partial identities of only one attribute (a
pseudonym) that agents can use to send messages to
other agents. An agent can preserve its privacy by us-
ing a different handler for each interaction. They also
consider that an agent can build up a reputation and
being trusted by other parties by reusing the same
handler across different interactions. However, they
do not provide any protection against PIUP. More-
over, in their proposal the system on which the agents
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run knows the association between the users of the
system and the agents that act on their behalf (usu-
ally known as semi-anonymity [19]). In our proposal,
neither the agents nor the system know the real iden-
tity of the entities. The PIdP only discloses this in-
formation in case of law enforcement.
9. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose formalized definitions of
partial identities and their relationship to trust and
reputation. Partial identities are a key concept for
identifying entities. Moreover, they play a crucial
role in trust and reputation, modeling part of the
context where trust and reputation take place. In
this sense, both trust and reputation are established
through partial identities.
We also define the partial identity unlinkability
problem (PIUP) based on partial identities. PIUP
can be more or less harmful depending on the final
domain of the application using trust and reputa-
tion models. In domains where users can be seriously
harmed (e.g. in an e-marketplace by losing money)
PIUP needs, at least, to be considered.
We finally propose a privacy preserving solution
to PIUP which takes into account privacy concerns.
It allows the building of trust and reputation through
partial identities while preventing entities from get-
ting rid of trust and reputation assessments in a given
system. The real identities of the entities in a system
are not disclosed except under special circumstances
such as law enforcement.
We implemented a prototype to validate our so-
lution to PIUP. However, further research is needed
in order to integrate our proposal into an agent plat-
form. Such an integration will result in a complete
architecture for deploying agent-based trust and rep-
utation systems without PIUP and respecting privacy
concerns. Thus, future work includes the design of
this architecture, its implementation and a perfor-
mance evaluation to assess the efficiency of our solu-
tion.
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